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ABSTRACT 
On the Internet, there is an uneasy tension between the 
security and usability of authentication mechanisms. 
An easy three-part classification is: "something you 
know" (e.g. password); "something you hold" (e.g. 
device holding digital certificate), and "who you are" 
(e.g. biometric assessment) [9]. Each of these has 
well-known problems; passwords are written down, 
guessable, or forgotten; devices are lost or stolen, and 
biometric assays alienate users. 
We have investigated a novel strategy of querying the 
user based on their personal history (a "Rip van 
Winkle" approach.) The sum of this information is 
large and well-known only to the individual. The 
volume is too large for impostors to learn; our 
observation is that, in the emerging environment, it is 
possible to collate and automatically query such 
information as an authentication test. 
 
We report a proof of concept study based on the 
automatic generation of questions from electronic 
"calendar" information. While users were, 
surprisingly, unable to answer randomly generated 
questions any better than impostors, if questions are 
categorized according to appropriate psychological 
parameters then significant results can be obtained. 
We thus demonstrate the potential viability of this 
concept.  
 
General Terms 
Experimentation, Security, Human Factors, 
Standardization, and Verification. 
Keywords 
Internet security, password, human memory, user 
studies, security usability Identity theft, personal 
electronic data, user mobility,  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Users require secure authentication over the Internet 
with minimum personal effort. In the Internet café 
culture, they require to access sensitive personal 
information and transaction facilities on a “drop-in” 
basis from public machines. Furthermore users require 
to interact securely with many different organizations; 
performing separate authentication activity for each 
aggravates the security problem, and is furthermore 
resented by users. The state-of-the-art is the use of 
trusted third party for single sign-on via password, 
which gives an acceptable compromise.   
Figure 1 presents a general framework of the 
information flow between a user, third trusted party 
and other web sites. 
 
 
Figure (1) Authentication using trusted third party 
 
There are two major authentication stages: the initial 
authentication stage and the authentication at instant 
time stage [8]. (i) Users, in the initial authentication 
stage, register through some appropriate process with 
the trusted third party (TTP), at which point a shared 
secret is created.   (ii) When users attempt to access a 
secure site, they are redirected to the TTP, which 
performs an authentication process with the user and 
reports the result back to the originating site. If the 
TTP site is able to keep “session” information, then 
the TTP can confirm authentication with other 
sensitive sites during the session without further user 
interaction. 
A TTP can use any authentication mechanism; clear 
contenders are passwords, digital certificates, or 
biometric assay. Certificates offer users a far higher 
level of electronic security, but are not memorable and 
therefore require to be kept on a device, which is 
restrictive and open to physical loss. Biometric assay 
is, still, unacceptable to users and carries a relatively 
high opt-in cost, although of course these factors may 
change over time. We thus contend the majority 
requirement for TTP authentication is information the 
user knows, which is fully portable and lowest entry 
cost 
Passwords are not without human problems however. 
Even small passwords are difficult to remember. Yan 
[7] addressed this problem and remarked that there are 
trade offs between good non-guessable passwords and 
the limitations of the human memory. It is hard for 
users to remember random passwords, but others are 
guessable; although passwords provide users with 
mobility, they can be stolen, guessed, or cracked.  
Zviran [12] presented cognitive passwords as a 
method to overcoming this. Cognitive passwords are 
‘question based’ according to either fact or opinion, 
and are shown to be more memorable than 
alphanumeric strings. Significant others could not 
remember or guess more that 27%. Cartwright [3] 
presented challenge response questions that 
authenticate customers. The questions are generated 
from different resources: consumer credit, vehicle 
ownership, property ownership, and reference files. 
Dhamija and Perrig [6] and Brostoff and Sasse [2] 
presented an approach to improve the security of these 
systems using passwords. The approach relies on 
recognition-based, rather than recall-based 
authentication. The former researchers developed a 
web-based prototype that allows users to create image 
portfolios and to authenticate themselves to the system 
later by selecting their portfolios from a challenge set. 
Brostoff and Sasse presented passfaces as an 
alternative to password. Passfaces are a combination 
of different human faces. They mentioned that users 
better recognize passfaces than passwords.  
2. QUESTION BASED-MODEL  
 
Our research presents a solution that relies on 
electronic personal history. The underlying security 
relies not on a secret, but a volume of information 
known in detail only to the authentic user and too 
large for an impostor to learn. As much pertinent 
history is already recorded electronically, it is feasible 
to generate sparse questions from a very large data set, 
with each authentication attempt generating a different 
set of questions. Such information may be continually 
and incrementally released to the TTP and used as the 
basis of authentication, rather than the sharing of an 
explicit secret. We report here results of a pilot study 
based on a prototype of this concept. 
Figure (2) shows the prototype system in use. The 
TTP has access to a large volume of personal data, 
and randomly selects questions during authentication. 
Our study uses multiple choice questions for ease of 
generation and to allow statistically analysis; while 
these can clearly be guessed and are not suitable for 
real-world authentication, we are at present only 
attempting to assess the feasibility of such a 
mechanism in terms of statistical analysis of results 
and user acceptability; a real implementation would 
clearly require questions that are harder to guess. 
 
Figure (2) Question form generated from a 
calendar 
 
3. PILOT STUDY 
 
In the pilot study we have run two experiments. The 
data, in both experiments, included the electronic 
calendar data of staff in a UK university department. 
The electronic calendars were either in PalmOS or 
WindowsCE format.  
 
3.1. Problem Statement  
 
To assess the possibility of automatically generating 
questions based on recorded electronic history that a 
user can answer better than others who know the user 
well. 
 
3.1.1. First Experiment 
 
This experiment was designed as a low-cost feasibility 
test of the concept, and was not designed to extract 
meaningful statistics. Our sample size was six 
calendars, chosen from a set of colleagues well known 
to each other; and we generated five different 
true/false questions. Each subject was asked to 
attempt to answer all 30 questions. 
Events were selected randomly from all events entered 
in the PDA diary over the fortnight immediately 
preceding the test date; for each event, a true/false 
correct result was selected randomly, and then a 
question was generated according to a simple set of 
rules based on the time, day and date upon which it 
occurred. There was no attempt to apply any 
“intelligence” to understanding the nature of each 
diary entry 
We show sensitivity/specificity analysis of the results. 
Briefly, sensitivity is the probability measure of true 
positive, while specificity measures true negative.  
Sensitivity is the probability that a test (or symptom, 
or sign) is positive given the disease/condition being 
present. It is the true positive. Sensitivity = 
TP/TP+FN. 
Specificity the probability that a test (or symptom, or 
sign) is negative or absent given that the 
disease/condition is not present. It is the true negative. 
Specificity= TN/TN+FP [5] 
Thus a result of (1,1) implies perfect authentication, 
while for example (1,0) implies a test that everyone 
can pass. For single true/false questions, the best 
possible outcome is (1,0.5). see table (1). 
Table (1) Sensitivity and Specificity  
 
3.1.2. Results 
 
We expected users to remember their calendar data 
with a high sensitivity. However the result obtained 
was 0.53 with a range of 0.8 i.e. (±0.40). Interestingly, 
the high range is caused by highly variable 
performance among subjects, with between one and 
five questions being answered correctly. 
The specificity is consistent with our expectations of a 
random distribution, giving us some confidence that 
the questions were not answerable by impostors. 
However the fact that not everyone was able to answer 
their own questions better than randomly caused us to 
examine more deeply the patterns of questions that 
 Genuine Impostor 
Correct  Sensitivity = 
TP/TP+FN 
TP (True Positive ) 
FP (False Positive) 
Wrong  FN (False Negative) TN (True Negative) 
TN/TN+FP 
Total TP+FN =1 TN+FP =1 
were and were not correctly answered with respect to 
the literature governing human memory performance. 
 
Table (2) Sensitivity and Specificity (First 
Experiment) 
 
 
These results were unexpected; we had expected a far 
better recall of recent calendar events. Intuitive 
analysis of the individual questions however 
suggested the marked differences among individual 
performance could have been caused not by their 
memory per se, but by different behaviour patterns as 
to the type of event entered in their calendars. How 
does the human remember and what are parameters 
that can affect the human memory? What are the types 
of questions that are difficult for others to answer?  
 
3.2. Second Experiment 
 
3.2.1. OVERVIEW 
 
The human memory in psychology is classified as 
follow: sensor memory, working memory, and long-
term memory.  Long-term memory is divided into 
episodic, procedural and semantic memory.  
In our research, we have focused more on the long-
term memory and in particular the episodic memory 
which some researchers define it as autobiographical 
memory [1].  Human being can remember: recent 
events, repetitive events, and pleasant events better 
than any other events [4][10]. In this experiment, the 
questions are generated based on these memorable 
events. The calendar data are classified as recent, 
repetitive or pleasant events as follows. Matching the 
date of a calendar event against the current date 
classifies these events as recent events if it is within a 
month time. If the event is repeated once or twice 
within a month time, it is classified as repetitive event. 
At last, matching calendar events against a list of 
words e.g. birthdays, parties, and concerts etc. 
classifies events as pleasant events if these words are 
found in the calendar event. 
The other parameters, which were observed while the 
participants were answering the questions, were 
“Difficult” and “Easy”. As mentioned earlier, in the 
first experiment, the questions are “True” and “False” 
questions. Participants preferred to choose “True” as 
an answer to the questions.  They commented on the 
question, which its correct answer is “True” as an 
“Easy” question.  Conversely, they commented on the 
question that its correct answer is “false” as a 
“difficult” question.  
3.2.2. Experiment Design 
 
The Sample size was nine calendars, from each of 
which we generated eight questions. Their types were 
six (true / false) using the parameters (recent, 
repetitive, and pleasant) in each type there was a (true 
/ false) question, and two four-part multiple choice. 
This choice was driven by again keeping the 
experimental cost low, but attempting to show in a 
statistically significant manner than individuals could 
answer questions better than impostors; only a weak 
result, but necessary given the outcome of the first 
experiment. 
3.2.3. Sensitivity and Specificity Results (Second 
Experiment) All Questions  
 
In this experiment, we have done two sensitivity and 
specificity analysis, one for all questions types and 
another for the multiple-choice questions type. The 
results of the all types of questions came as follows: 
The sensitivity is 0.71 ±0.19 while the specificity is 
0.57 ±0.10.  
This means that the person can answer his calendar 
correctly if we consider the memorable events and 
others can’t recall or guess the answers correctly. See 
Table (3).  
 
Table (3) Sensitivity and Specificity Second 
Experiment 
 
 
The sensitivity of the multiple-choice questions is 0.75 
±0.25, and the specificity is 0.78 ±0.18.  Although 
over very small numbers of tests, these results are 
already significant, and are included mainly to show 
the potential of generating much less guessable 
questions to maximise the specificity whilst 
maintaining the sensitivity.  
 
 
 Genuine Impostor 
Correct  0.53 ± 0.40 0.5 
Wrong  0.47 0.5 ±  0.20  
Answer Genuine Impostor 
Correct  0.71 ±0.19 0.45 
Wrong  0.29 0.43 ±0.10 
Total 1 1 
 
 
Table (4) Sensitivity and Specificity (Multiple-
Choice Questions) 
 
 
  answer Genuine Impostor 
Correct  0.75 ±0.25 0.78 
Wrong  0.25 0.22 ±0.18  
Total  1 1 
 
 
3.2.4. ROC GRAPH 
 
“Receiver Operating Characteristic Analysis” ROC 
illustrates relations between the sensitivity and 
specificity of each question.  The diagonal line on the 
graph from (0,0) in the lower left hand corner to (1,1) 
in the upper right hand corner reflects the 
characteristics of a test with no discriminating power. 
The closer the graph gets to the upper left hand corner 
(0, 1), the better the test is at discriminating between 
cases and non-cases [11].  All of the questions are 
above the curve except for question four which is type 
recent difficult.  The curve is slightly under the 
accepted area. See Figure (4).  
 
Figure (4) ROC Curve 
 
Table (5) presents the results of the “Area under the 
Curve” AUC that varies from 1, perfect accurate, to 
0.5.  Almost all the questions are above 0.5[11], which 
mean the idea is feasible.  
 
Table (5) Area Under the Curve (AUC) 
 
 Q1 Pleasant Easy, Q2 Pleasant Difficult, Q3 Recent 
Easy, Q4 Recent Difficult, Q5 Repeat Easy, Q6 
Repeated Difficult, Q7 Multiple-Choice, Q8 Multiple 
Choice 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
 
Question based model of authentication presented a 
solution to some of the problems in identifying users 
over the Internet. The pilot study determined the 
feasibility of using personal electronic data to 
authenticate users. In the second experiment, because 
the types of questions were selected based on the 
memorable parameters, sensitivity was high enough to 
demonstrate the feasibility of the approach. The 
recent, repetitive, pleasant question types are better 
remembered and these types need further 
investigations in a bigger experiment.  Additionally, 
using multiple choice improved specificity without 
impacting sensitivity. The ranking scale of correctness 
acknowledged the two factors, which are easy and 
difficult. The easy questions are on the top of the scale 
and difficult questions are on the bottom of the scale. 
This goes for both the genuine and impostor answers. 
In the future, more investigation is required to gain 
more confidence in the results. This pilot study used 
only one format of the electronic data. The research 
can go further and use other electronic data such as 
data stored on mobile phone, GPS, PC, government or 
organizations database and, in the future with the 
smart environment application, there will a huge 
amount of stored electronic personal data. This large 
bulk of information can provide better security and, at 
the same time, will provide users with mobility 
because it is memorable.  
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